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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents empirical evidence of the factors that motivate trainee auditors to blow 
the whistle on wrongdoing in an audit firm. It investigates whether organisational justice 
(comprised of procedural, interactional and distributive justice) is positively correlated with 
the willingness to blow the whistle. It also investigates whether the type of justice 
(procedural, interactional and distributive justice) affects the decision to blow the whistle. 
Finally, it investigates whether professional performance, morality-proxied by a sense of 
religion-, seniority, age and gender affect this decision to blow the whistle. 
The results indicate that most trainee auditors‟ sense of organisational justice is positively 
correlated to their likelihood to blow the whistle. All three justice dimensions (procedural, 
interactional and distributive justice) are found to increase trainee auditors‟ propensity to 
blow the whistle. High interactional justice is found to be a greater motivation to blow the 
whistle than procedural and distributive justice. Low distributive justice is found to be least 
effective as an impediment to whistleblowing, whilst low procedural and interactional justice 
are more effective than low distributive justice in deterring whistleblowing.  
This research finds that age, gender, seniority and religion do not affect the trainee auditor‟s 
propensity to blow the whistle. Most recent performance ratings do not affect trainee 
auditors‟ decision to blow the whistle, except in the case of trainees who received a low 
performance rating when there was low interactional justice.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Purpose of this study 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the factors which may motivate or impede 
trainee auditors to blow the whistle on wrongdoings at an audit firm1. In particular, this 
research aims to identify whether a sense of organisational justice will increase the likelihood 
of trainee auditors to blow the whistle or not. An Irish study, conducted by Brennan and Kelly 
(2007), investigated factors affecting trainee auditors‟ willingness to blow the whistle, whilst 
an American study conducted by Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, and Thornton (2010) indicated 
that perceptions of organisational justice increase the probability of accountants blowing the 
whistle on organisational wrongdoing. The objective of this research is to investigate whether 
trainee auditors‟ sense of organisational justice (comprised of procedural, interactional and 
distributive justice) is positively correlated with their likelihood to blow the whistle on 
wrongdoing in the audit firm. It also aims to determine if the type of organisational justice 
(procedural, interactional and distributive justice) materially affects the propensity to blow the 
whistle. Lastly, it aims to determine if professional performance, morality-proxied by a sense 
of religion-, seniority, age and gender affect a trainee auditor‟s decision to blow the whistle.  
1.2 Definitions  
 Whistleblowing: The purposeful and voluntary disclosure of previously privileged 
information, which exposes wrongdoing and can result in rectification of the 
wrongdoing (Jubb, 1999). 
 Organisational justice: Employees‟ perceptions of fairness in the workplace 
(Moorman, 1991), which comprise interactional, procedural and distributive elements 
(Tansky, 1993).  
 Interactional justice: Employees‟ perceptions of the fairness of the inter-personal 
treatment they receive in the workplace (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993). 
 Procedural justice: Employees‟ perceptions of the fairness of procedures followed in 
the workplace, to make decisions (Folger & Greenberg, 1985)  
 Distributive justice: The fairness of the outcomes of processes followed in the 
workplace (Lee, 1995). 
                                                          
1
 In this study, whistleblowing within the audit firm refers to reporting a wrongdoing within the audit 
firm, and not the reporting of a client‟s affairs. 
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 Organisational citizenship behaviour: Voluntary activities carried out by employees to 
benefit the organisation, despite the absence of an explicit reward for such activities 
(Lewis, 2010). 
1.3 Background and contribution of the research 
The financial statement frauds that were uncovered at WorldCom and Enron have resulted 
in great economic and social costs, including a decreased confidence in financial reporting 
(Schmidt, 2005). In the cases of Enron and WorldCom, the fraud was revealed by the 
employees of the entity, rather than by external auditors or analysts (Schmidt, 2005). 
Consequently, global regulators have recognised the importance of whistleblowing in the 
detection of fraud and have introduced legislation designed to encourage employees to 
report wrongdoings (Schmidt, 2005).  
In South Africa, the preamble to the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 [the PDA] 
emphasises that criminal and irregular conduct in both State and private entities hinders 
good governance. Such conduct may damage accountability, transparency and could, 
therefore, obstruct good corporate governance and effective governance of organs of State. 
South Africa‟s King Code and Report on Corporate Governance has a similar message (King 
Committee, 2009). To this end, the PDA and codes of corporate governance highlight the 
need for a culture which will encourage employee disclosure of information relating to 
irregular conduct. As such, whistleblowing research is relevant to eradicating irregular 
conduct (in corporate and state entities) in South Africa (PDA, 2000). 
Daft (2006) states that, despite any codes of conduct or other ethical structures 
organisations may have in place, organisations need to depend on individuals to blow the 
whistle if they detect irregular activity. Rossouw (2002) suggests that this willingness to 
eliminate irregular conduct must be shared by all organisation members. This calls for a 
need to ensure that organisation members internalise that irregular behaviour is neither in 
the organisation‟s interests nor their own (Rossouw, 2002). This study proposes that the use 
of fair policies, implemented at an organisational level, provides an avenue for organisations 
to encourage such beliefs. Consequently, this study may have important implications for 
organisations, particularly South Africa‟s large audit firms that strive to encourage internal 
whistleblowing. 
The importance of whistleblowing in an audit firm setting to external audit quality is 
emphasised in professional auditing standards (International Auditing and Assurance Board 
[IAASB], 2009b, 2013). External audit quality can be improved, both internationally and in 
South Africa, by ensuring audit firms develop, implement and maintain adequate quality 
control systems (Financial Services Authority & Financial Reporting Council, 2010; IAASB, 
9 
 
2013; International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 2007; IRBA, 2007, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011). Audit firms need to take appropriate action to resolve weaknesses 
identified on individual audits, as well as „systemic issues‟ exposed by internal and external 
monitoring systems, in order to preserve audit quality (IAASB, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). In 
particular,  an audit firm is required, per International Standard on Quality Control 1- Quality 
Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews [ISQC1], to establish defined channels 
enabling personnel to raise concerns „without fear of reprisals‟ (IAASB, 2009b). 
Consequently, finding ways to encourage whistleblowing at a firm level is important for 
quality control and the auditing profession, as a whole.  
Therefore, this study makes an important contribution as it provides insight into the factors 
that affect an individual‟s decision to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in an audit firm so as to 
find ways to encourage reporting (MiceIi & Near, 1995). In addition, this study proposes 
organisational justice as a means for audit firms to encourage whistleblowing, and in so 
doing, maintain audit quality (IAASB, 2009b, 2013).  
Concurrently, the research also makes an important theoretical contribution by adding to the 
body of evidence in support of the relevance of organisational justice theory in a professional 
setting. Brennan and Kelly (2007) identified significant factors affecting trainee auditors‟ 
decision to blow the whistle. Although trainee auditors may ‟have confidence in current 
internal reporting structures,‟ Brennan and Kelly‟s (2007) results showed that firms can take 
steps to further encourage whistleblowing within the audit firm. This study expands on this 
suggestion by proposing organisational justice as a framework to increase trainee auditors‟ 
confidence in whistleblowing policies and the likelihood of trainee auditors blowing the 
whistle on wrongdoing in audit firms. In doing so, this study adds to the existing literature on 
motivations for, and impediments to, whistleblowing. This is especially important as there is 
a limited amount of empirical evidence on organisational whistleblowing in an external 
auditing context (Brennan & Kelly, 2007) and nothing from a South African perspective.   
Finally, the research expands on theoretical developments of Seifert et al (2010) and 
Brennan and Kelly (2007). The research is the first to demonstrate that a sense of 
organisational justice is not relevant only for qualified professionals (Seifert et al, 2010); it is 
equally important for trainee external auditors at large South African audit firms. Unlike the 
study by Seifert et al (2010), this thesis also argues that the type of organisational justice – 
distributive, procedural or interactional – can influence the decision to blow the whistle, 
thereby adding to our understanding or organisational justice theory (see Tansky, 1993; 
King, 1997) 
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1.4 Limitations and delimitations  
 This research concentrates only on how a sense of organisational justice is 
correlated with the decision to blow the whistle. Certain other variables which may 
impact the whistleblowing decision, such as age and gender, are treated as 
extraneous (Section 2.4). As such, the research does not necessarily prove causality 
(an inherent limitation of most quantitative studies in Social Sciences).   
 While every effort was made to select a random sample of trainee accountants, 
inherent time and cost constraints mean that the sample selection was motivated by 
convenience (Creswell, 2009). As a result, there is some risk that the results will not 
be generalizable to other population groups. A number of reliability tests are, 
however, included in the analysis, as discussed in Section 3.1.  
 The research considers only the views of trainee accountants. This allows the 
researcher to limit the impact of additional variables, such as obtaining a professional 
qualification or legal liability of auditors, on the decision to blow the whistle (Creswell, 
2009). The relevance of organisational justice for qualified accountants and auditors 
is deferred for future research.  
  Finally the research uses organisational justice as a theoretical framework for 
analysing results (Seifert et al, 2010). Other theoretical models for explaining whistle-
blowing (such as utilitarian models which focus on the perceived costs and benefits 
of reporting and reward models) are not dealt with (MiceIi & Near, 1995; Xu & 
Ziegenfuss, 2008). Importantly, this means that cultural and social heuristics are not 
specifically considered in this thesis. How these variables impact the decision to blow 
the whistle is deferred for future research.  
1.5 Assumptions 
 Trainee auditors would respond in the same way indicated in the questionnaires as in 
a real-life situation. 
 Trainee auditors at large and medium sized auditing firms are representative of all 
trainee auditors at large and medium-sized auditing firms. This assumption is 
reasonable given that the majority of South Africa‟s trainee Chartered Accountants 
are employed in the country‟s large audit firms. The fact that the study does not, 
however, include the views of trainees at smaller audit firms is an inherent limitation 
of this research.  
 The safeguards discussed in Section 3.1 ensured that all questionnaires were 
completed accurately and honestly.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 What is whistleblowing? 
A universal definition of whistleblowing does not exist (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). 
Whistleblowing has been used as a general term in business language to describe an act 
that exposes wrongdoing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Jubb, 1999). In Jubb (1999), a more 
restrictive definition of whistleblowing was developed as: 
„Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto 
public record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or 
information of an organisation, about non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether 
actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is under the control of that 
organisation, to an external entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing (Jubb, 
1999, p. 83).‟ 
Jubb‟s (1999) definition differs slightly from the definition used by Miceli and Near (1985) 
who define whistleblowing as, „the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of 
illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action.‟ Jubb (1999) does not consider reporting 
wrongdoing within the organisation (internal reporting) as whistleblowing, as information that 
is not exposed to the public does not violate organisational confidence. Miceli and Near 
(1985), however, do not preclude internal reporting from being defined as whistleblowing. 
Miceli (1992) states that internal whistleblowing is conceptually similar to external 
whistleblowing. Both internal and external whistleblowing involve action taken by an 
organisation member who wants to stop a wrongdoing (Miceli, 1992). This action can invoke 
similar consequences (whether retaliation or support from others) as a result of the reporting, 
regardless of whether the reporting is made to the public or internally (Miceli, 1992). It is 
important to note that, not only is Miceli and Near‟s (1985) definition more commonly used 
(Alleyne, Hudaib, & Pike, 2012; Brennan & Kelly, 2007) but there is a substantial amount of 
literature which argues that internal reporting can be considered to be whistleblowing 
(Alleyne et al, 2012; Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Miceli, 1992; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). 
Miceli and Near (1985) describe whistleblowing as a process rather than an event. It 
consists of (1) the whistleblower, (2) the whistleblowing act, (3) the party who receives the 
complaint and (4) the organisation, which the complaint is about (Miceli & Near, 1985). The 
first step in the process is the observer‟s decision whether an activity is „illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate‟ (Miceli & Near, 1985). The observer of such wrongful activity must then decide if 
this activity should be reported (Miceli & Near, 1985). If the observer reports such wrongful 
activity, the organisation must make a decision regarding the cessation of such activity 
12 
 
(Miceli & Near, 1985). Lastly, the organisation must make a decision relating to the whistle-
blower and decide whether he must be ignored or if he should be punished (in the event that 
the organisation considers the complaint to be „frivolous or invalid‟) (Miceli & Near, 1985).  
2.2 Whistleblowing in an external auditing context 
The value of the external audit function depends on the level of confidence placed in it by 
society (Limperg, 1985; Power, 2003). This level of confidence is particularly important for 
the audit function as it is the reason for its existence (Limperg, 1985). The auditor acts as a 
„confidential agent‟ for society and, therefore, society values the auditor‟s opinion over what 
has been communicated to them by any others (Limperg, 1985).  
It is clear that society still finds the audit valuable (Mock, Turner, Gray, & Coram, 2009). If 
the confidence in the profession were destroyed, however, the audit function would become 
useless (Limperg, 1985; Power, 2003). Users perceive the external auditor as being a „public 
watchdog‟ and have a responsibility to serve the public interest (McEnroe & Martens, 2001; 
Mock et al, 2009). The external audit profession asserts that this public interest is protected 
by ensuring that their clients are held accountable by expressing an opinion on the fair 
presentation of financial statements (Alleyne et al, 2012). Hanlon (1996) argues that this 
duty to serve the public interest may be discounted, at times, to appease clients as audit 
firms must also survive as profit-making entities.  
Sikka (2008) asserts that the pressure to create wealth encourages some accounting firms 
to indulge in irregular practice. Sikka (2008) states that this „enterprise culture‟ is evidenced 
by many past incidences where accounting firms have resorted to tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, corruption, money laundering and operating cartels in order to pursue profits. 
Similarly, audit staff are often exposed to time budget pressures that could influence them to 
adopt irregular auditing practices (Willett & Page, 1996). Otley and Pierce (1996), for 
example, found that the majority of audit staff participants in their study indicated that they 
had been directly or indirectly instructed to underreport their hours worked2.  
The auditing profession should aim to achieve a level of audit quality that meets the one 
demanded by the users (Maastricht Accounting Auditing and Information Management 
Research Center, 2010). To this end, most jurisdictions require audit firms to comply with 
auditing standards which, in turn, require the development and application of internal policies 
and procedures to ensure high quality audit engagements (IAASB, 2013).  
For example, the IAASB (2013) note that an audit firm‟s internal policies and procedures 
affect the quality of audits undertaken. To preserve audit quality, firms should establish 
                                                          
2
 Examining the effect of capitalistic pressures on audit quality is not in the scope of this study. 
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adequate quality control procedures (IAASB, 2013). Firms should maintain this system of 
quality control to ensure compliance with professional standards and other regulations, and 
that appropriate audit reports be issued in the circumstances (IAASB, 2009b). To determine 
whether the firms‟ system of quality control is „relevant, adequate and operating effectively‟, 
firms should develop a monitoring process (IAASB, 2009b). The monitoring process should 
facilitate defined channels, allowing personnel to raise complaints and allegations relating to 
non-compliance with firm policies, as well as with professional standards and regulations 
(IAASB, 2009b). This form of internal whistleblowing can enable audit firms to take 
appropriate action to resolve weaknesses identified on individual audits, as well as „systemic 
issues‟ exposed by internal and external monitoring systems, in order to preserve audit 
quality (IAASB, 2009a, 2009b, 2013).  
In addition to the standards issued by the IAASB in the U.K., the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published 
„The Audit Firm Governance Code‟ (the Code) to provide guidelines on  governance practice 
for firms which audit listed companies (ICAEW, 2010). The Code seeks to assist audit firms 
in their goal to provide high quality audits and, therefore, to maintain the confidence of 
shareholders in their audit reports (ICAEW, 2010). It sets out a list of principles with which 
the relevant audit firms must comply for financial years on or after 1 June 2010 (ICAEW, 
2010). The audit firms must report on their level of compliance, stating the reasons for non-
compliance (a „comply or explain‟ approach) (ICAEW, 2010). Principle D.4 of the Code refers 
to whistleblowing, in particular, and states that an audit firm must implement confidential 
whistleblowing policies and procedures (ICAEW, 2010). These policies and procedures must 
enable effective reporting about concerns relating to the firm‟s work quality, values and 
professional judgement to the benefit of public interest (ICAEW, 2010). 
In South Africa, Chartered Accountants must comply with the Code of Professional Conduct 
(CPC) issued by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants [SAICA], and external 
auditors must comply with the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors [IRBA] Code 
(SAICA, 2010). The CPC is consistent with the IRBA Code, as well as the International 
Federation of Accountants‟ [IFAC] code (IRBA, 2010b; SAICA, 2010). The CPC requires 
compliance with the fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional behaviour, 
confidentiality, professional competence and due care (SAICA, 2010). Threats to any of the 
fundamental principles may be reduced or eliminated to an acceptable level by implementing 
safeguards (SAICA, 2010). Firm-wide safeguards include implementing and documenting 
policies and procedures that require compliance with the fundamental principles and 
monitoring quality control (SAICA, 2010). Safeguards to monitor quality control can include 
an effective whistleblowing policy (IAASB, 2009b).  
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In addition to codes of professional conduct, South African audit firm inspections are 
conducted by the IRBA to identify areas of deficiencies in audit quality (IRBA, 2007, 2009, 
2010a, 2011). Quality control issues relating to whistleblowing, in particular, indicate that the 
firms‟ policies and procedures intended to ensure the monitoring of quality control should be 
improved (IRBA, 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2011). The IRBA found that there is inadequate 
recording of complaints and some firms do not have a formal process to deal with non-legal 
complaints (IRBA, 2007, 2009, 2010a). In addition, some employees were not aware of the 
firm‟s policies to report unethical conduct (IRBA, 2007). This indicates that audit firms can do 
more to improve their quality control monitoring systems by encouraging whistleblowing in 
order to increase the quality of their audits performed (IRBA, 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2011).  
The external auditing professional standards and codes of conduct do emphasise the 
importance of monitoring systems to preserve audit quality. Whistleblowing forms an integral 
part of this monitoring process (IAASB, 2009b, 2013; IRBA, 2010b). There is, however, little 
guidance on the factors that encourage or hinder effective whistleblowing in an external audit 
firm. In this regard, it is imperative to know what factors will increase the likelihood of 
whistleblowing, so as to encourage it (MiceIi & Near, 1995). 
2.3 Motivations for blowing the whistle 
Macey (2007) notes that, in the case of Enron, employees were aware of the potential 
financial statement fraud yet remained silent. Only a few employees were brave enough to 
blow the whistle on accounting malfeasances (Moberly, 2006). Clearly, the decision to blow 
the whistle is a complex one (Macey, 2007).  
There is a limited understanding of what motivates people to blow the whistle, especially in 
an auditing context (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). Dozier and Miceli (1985) propose that 
interactions between certain individual personality traits and their „perceptions of 
organisational situations‟ may encourage whistleblowing. The number of empirical studies 
conducted to determine these variables in organisational whistleblowing, however, is limited 
(Brennan & Kelly, 2007). There are even fewer empirical whistleblowing studies conducted 
in an accounting or auditing context (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). Of particular interest for the 
purpose of this research is the perceived state of organisational justice3. 
                                                          
3
 Variables from prior literature, which study the factors that impact an individual‟s decision to blow the 
whistle, are identified in Appendix 2. The factors affecting the whistleblowing decision amongst trainee 
auditors, in particular are identified as extraneous variables in Section 2.4.  
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2.3.1 The structural model and organisational justice theory 
Moberly‟s (2006) structural model is based on the assumption that companies which 
establish a formalised internal channel for reporting wrongdoing will encourage employees to 
blow the whistle on misconduct. This is supported by Brennan and Kelly (2007) who showed 
that the existence of formal structures and internal reporting channels increase the 
probability of trainee external auditors‟ reporting of an ethical violation. According to Seifert 
et al (2010) organisational justice theory provides a „framework‟ for developing structural 
mechanisms to increase the probability of employee whistleblowing. In fact, Seifert et al 
(2010) found that management accountants who perceived organisational whistleblowing 
processes as being fair would be more likely to blow the whistle on corporate wrongdoing.  
Organisational justice refers to the employees‟ perceptions of fairness in the workplace 
(Moorman, 1991). Employees who perceive that they receive fair treatment will be more 
likely to adopt positive attitudes about their work and work environment (Moorman, 1991; 
Tansky, 1993). Consequently, employees with these perceptions are more likely to exhibit 
positive social behaviour and act in ways intended to benefit their organisations (Moorman, 
1991; Tansky, 1993).  
According to Lewis (2010), whistleblowing can be seen as a type of organisational 
citizenship behaviour. Organisational citizenship behaviour can be defined as an activity 
carried out by an employee to benefit the organisation (Lewis, 2010). It is voluntary and 
carried out by an employee, even though there may not be an explicit reward for such 
behaviour (Lewis, 2010). Employees may blow the whistle as a demonstration of 
organisational citizenship behaviour, despite potential victimisation by such organisation 
(Lewis, 2010). In fact, whistle-blowing is said to be demonstrative of a „pro-social behaviour‟ 
(Dozier & Miceli, 1985). „Pro-social behaviour‟ can be defined as an act directed at a person, 
or persons, which is intended to benefit such person(s) (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). Dozier 
and Miceli (1985) explain, by referring to Staub (1978), that „pro-social behaviour‟ is not 
solely altruistic in nature and involves both selfish and unselfish motives. The selfish reasons 
for whistleblowing could include „self-aggrandisement‟ (Bok, 1980), or one may merely want 
to rectify an issue directly affecting one‟s role in the workplace (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). 
Dozier and Miceli (1985) conclude that, even if someone blows the whistle for seemingly 
selfish reasons, whistleblowing can benefit others (and the organisation). Consequently, 
whistleblowing involves selfish and unselfish motives, even if the unselfish reasons do not 
dominate the motives behind the decision to blow the whistle (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).  
Whistleblowing can be linked to perceptions of organisational justice, as the whistleblower‟s 
confidence in the organisational structure depends on whether the organisation‟s 
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whistleblowing procedures are perceived by the potential whistleblower as fair (Near, 
Dworkin, & Miceli, 1993). In the study conducted by Seifert et al (2010) it was confirmed that 
when organisational whistleblowing policies and procedures are perceived as fair, the 
likelihood that a financial statement fraud will be reported by a whistleblower increases 
2.3.2 Components of organisational justice 
Organisational justice, or „fairness‟ (Moorman, 1991), encompasses distributive, interactional 
and procedural justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). There has, however, 
been limited research conducted to determine the relationship between whistleblowing and 
general organisational justice, save the relationship between whistleblowing and the three 
components of organisational justice (Seifert et al, 2010). Although there has been some 
prior literature linking the three components of organisational justice to general acts of 
organisational citizenship behaviour (Bies, Martin, & Brockner, 1993; Moorman, 1991; 
Moorman, Niehoff, & Organ, 1993), Treviño and Weaver (2001) and Seifert et al (2010) are 
examples of the few studies linking organisational justice to whistleblowing in particular. 
Treviño and Weaver (2001) investigated the effect of employees‟ perceptions of 
organisational justice and their organisations‟ commitment to „ethics program follow-through‟ 
on ethical behaviour. „Ethics program follow-through‟ was taken to mean that the 
organisation adhered to employees‟ expectations of its ethics policies. Results showed that 
where employees perceive general organisational justice and „ethics program follow-
through‟, the propensity to blow the whistle increases. Importantly, the impact of „ethics 
program follow-through‟ was found to be less when the organisation was already perceived 
as being fair (Treviño & Weaver, 2001). Seifert et al (2010) identified that not only do higher 
levels of general organisational justice increase the propensity to blow the whistle, but each 
of the three components of organisational justice has the ability to increase the probability of 
employee whistleblowing. Tansky (1993) indicates that future research can be done, 
globally, to examine the perceptions of each of the three justice theories. 
Distributive justice 
Distributive justice refers to the fairness of the outcomes an employee receives (Lee, 1995). 
Near et al (1993) assert that improvements in the procedural and distributive justice, which is 
experienced by the whistleblower, could improve the whistleblower‟s contentment with the 
whistleblowing process and its outcomes.  There is distributive justice when the organisation 
is not harmed and there is a „satisfactory outcome‟ for organisation members (Near et al, 
1993). Efforts to increase distributive justice for whistle-blowers will be more likely to 
encourage it (Near et al, 1993). In a study conducted by Moorman (1991), distributive justice 
perceptions did not influence organisational citizenship behaviour. In the specific context of 
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whistleblowing, however, Seifert et al (2010) proved that higher levels of distributive justice 
increase the propensity to blow the whistle. 
Proposition 1: The greater the sense of distributive justice, the greater the 
propensity of trainee auditors to blow the whistle 
Procedural justice 
Procedural justice results when the reporting procedures followed by the whistle-blower are 
perceived as „fair‟ (Near et al, 1993). Moorman et al (1993) showed that the fair treatment of 
employees and the following fair procedures in an organisation supports organizational 
citizenship behaviour. Employees treated fairly by their organisation are likely to be 
conscientious in relation to their work and to attempt to prevent problems with other 
employees (Moorman et al, 1993). In addition, fairness seems to encourage moral 
obligations (Moorman et al, 1993). Employees feel obliged to match the organisation‟s fair 
treatment (Moorman et al, 1993). This is supported by an American study conducted by Bies 
et al (1993) who conducted a study on employees who were laid off in terms of a new 
legislation. It was found that perceived fairness of the procedure affected employees‟ 
inclination to display organisational citizenship behaviour (Bies et al, 1993). A higher level of 
procedural justice is seen to increase the likelihood to blow the whistle (Seifert et al, 2010). 
Proposition 2: The greater the sense of procedural justice, the greater the 
propensity of trainee auditors to blow the whistle 
Interactional justice 
There is a social aspect of procedural justice (Greenberg, 1993). Perceptions of fairness 
relate to how people are treated (Greenberg, 1993), which Bies and Moag (1986) labelled as 
interactional justice. Employees perceive that their supervisor is responsible for the 
treatment of employees and, hence, may „reciprocate‟ a supervisor‟s fair treatment by 
engaging in organizational citizenship behaviour (Tansky, 1993). Tansky (1993) found that 
perceptions of fairness are strongly linked to the relationship between a supervisor and his 
or her subordinate. Furthermore, the relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate is 
positively linked to organizational citizenship behaviour (Tansky, 1993). Employees who 
enjoy a positive relationship with their supervisor may perceive that they gain benefits over 
and above their „economic exchange‟ with the employer and, hence, may be more likely to 
display voluntary organisational citizenship behaviour (Tansky, 1993). In fact, higher levels 
of interactional justice are positively related to blowing the whistle on corporate fraud (Seifert 
et al, 2010). 
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Proposition 3: The greater the sense of interactional justice, the greater the 
propensity of trainee auditors to blow the whistle 
2.4 Other motivational factors 
The whistleblowing literature shows that the decision to blow the whistle is complex (Macey, 
2007) and may involve a combination of individual and situational factors (Miceli & Near, 
1988). The most common factors identified in previous research are briefly discussed below 
to identify extraneous variables included in the analyses discussed in Section 3.1 (also see 
Appendix 2).  
2.4.1 Good performance  
Prior literature shows that whistleblowers tend to be good performers in the workplace 
(Brewer & Selden, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1988). In particular, it was found that employees 
who have recently received a good performance rating are more likely to blow the whistle 
(Miceli & Near, 1988). Consequently, this research will include performance ratings as an 
extraneous variable. 
2.4.2 Religion 
Results of previous studies show that having a greater sense of moral obligation to blow the 
whistle will increase the likelihood of whistleblowing (Kennett, Downs, & Durler, 2011; 
Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009), whilst a lower level of moral reasoning will decrease the 
propensity to blow the whistle (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991). Conroy and Emerson (2004) 
found that religious belief is significantly linked to ethical perceptions. In this research, a 
sense of religion will be used as a proxy for a moral obligation to blow the whistle, to identify 
if a greater ethical awareness will increase the propensity of a trainee auditor‟s 
whistleblowing behaviour (Padia & Maroun, 2012).  
2.4.3 Level of seniority (Length of service) 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) showed that trainee auditors who had progressed further in their 
careers than others had, were more likely to blow the whistle externally. In addition, Miceli 
and Near (1988) showed that the greater an employee‟s length of service, the greater 
likelihood to blow the whistle. In this research, the level of seniority and length of service is 
taken to mean the trainee auditor‟s level of progression in his/her articles to become a 
Chartered Accountant. Participant trainee auditors will be asked, per the questionnaire, how 
far they are in completion of their articles to become Chartered Accountants (first, second or 
third year of articles).  
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2.4.4 Age 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) found that older trainee auditors are less likely to report externally, 
as they had greater concerns about the effect of whistleblowing on their career prospects. In 
particular, it was found that the propensity to blow the whistle decreases for trainees older 
than 25 (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). Participant age will, therefore, be included as a control 
variable by asking the trainees to indicate whether they are 25 years old, below 25 years old 
or over 25 years old. 
2.4.5 Gender 
Liyanarachchi and Newdick (2009) showed that female accounting students showed more 
inclination to blow the whistle on corporate wrongdoing than their male counterparts. The 
increased likelihood of females blowing the whistle, rather than males, has also been shown 
in other studies (Seifert et al, 2010). On the contrary, Miceli and Near (1988) showed that 
males would be more likely to blow the whistle than their female counterparts. Other 
research showed that gender was not a significant factor affecting the decision to blow the 
whistle (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Mustapha & Siaw, 2012). As the prior research does not 
reach a consensus, gender is included in the analysis as a control variable. 
2.4.6 Audit firm size 
Miceli and Near (1988) showed that working for a larger organisation is likely to increase an 
employee‟s decision to blow the whistle. This is consistent with Brennan and Kelly‟s (2007) 
study conducted in an auditing context. Larger audit firm size increases trainee auditors‟ 
confidence in internal whistleblowing policies and structures, which increases the propensity 
to blow the whistle (Brennan & Kelly, 2007).  
How the size of an audit firm impacts on the behaviour of individual employees is, however, 
a complex issue which involves more than just the propensity to blow the whistle. The 
availability of firm resources, the development of specific cultures at large or smaller firms 
and a sense of individuality can, for example, be relevant determinants (DeAngelo, 1981;  
King III, 1999). As such, this research is limited to only large audit firms to allow these 
variables to be held constant4. This is an inherent limitation of the study (see Section 5) but 
one which allows for otherwise difficult-to-measure variables to be held constant.  
2.4.7 Seriousness of the wrongdoing 
A greater perception of the seriousness of a wrongdoing will increase the likelihood to blow 
the whistle (Elias, 2008; Mustapha & Siaw, 2012). In the study conducted by Brennan and 
                                                          
4
 Due to the practical difficulty of obtaining responses from trainees at small firms, and time 
constraints, this study focuses only on trainee auditors working at large and medium-sized auditing 
firms. The effect of audit firm size on whistleblowing is not studied. 
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Kelly (2007) on trainee auditors, however, it was found that trainee auditors could not 
distinguish between material and immaterial events in the scenarios presented. This was 
attributed to youth and inexperience (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). As this research explores the 
perceptions of a similar profile of respondents, the perceived seriousness of the wrong-doing 
is not included in the analysis. The scenario used in the final survey, however, presented a 
situation which would probably affect the audit opinion (Brennan & Kelly, 2007).  
Nevertheless, excluding the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing from the analysis is an 
inherent limitation of this research.  
2.4.8 Legislative protection and training in statutory duties to blow the 
whistle 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) showed, in their study, that training in statutory duties to blow the 
whistle increases trainee auditors‟ confidence in internal whistleblowing policies and 
structures, which increases the propensity to blow the whistle.  Although Brennan and Kelly 
(2007) showed that legislative protection is not a significant variable impacting trainee 
auditors‟ decision, Seifert et al (2010) state that the results of previous studies examining 
factors affecting an accountant‟s decision to blow the whistle may apply only in cases where 
certain whistleblowing structures exist. Seifert et al (2010) assert that research into the 
factors which may motivate or impede a person to blow the whistle may be considered when 
his/her specific regulatory environment is specified. Furthermore, Miceli, Rehg, Near, and 
Ryan (1999) showed that laws implemented to promote whistleblowing increase the 
likelihood of whistleblowing.  
This study does not, however, investigate the effect of legislative protection on the decision 
to blow the whistle. It focuses on a trainee auditor blowing the whistle on management in an 
auditing firm. It does not deal with the situation where an auditor blows the whistle on the 
client in terms of Section 45 of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005, as is discussed by 
Maroun and Gowar (2012). In addition, the research is based only in South Africa, with the 
result that all respondents are subject to the same legislative environment, making it difficult 
to test the effect of legal protection for whistle-blowers based only on hypothetical 
information. As a result, legislative protection is irrelevant for the purpose of this study. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study uses primary data to investigate the factors affecting future accountants‟ decision 
to blow the whistle. The design of this research is quantitative and inspired by an interpretive 
epistemology, as it studies individuals‟ perceptions (Baker & Bettner, 1997; Creswell, 2013; 
Maroun, 2012). The study determines whether trainee auditors‟ sense of organisational 
justice is positively correlated with their likelihood to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in the 
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audit firm. It uses a quantitative method to aggregate and summarise perceptions of trainee 
auditors. It makes no attempt to quantify the actual magnitude of the justice effect on the 
propensity to blow the whistle (for example, equation modelling is not carried out in this 
study) and does not claim to prove causality.  
3.1 Research design, data collection and data analysis 
This research uses a similar method to the one employed by Seifert et al (2010), where 
questionnaires involving short scenarios were presented to the participants. The use of 
scenarios in experimental design is frequent in previous research on whistleblowing 
behaviour (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; King, 1997; Patel, 2003; Singer, Mitchell, & Turner, 
1998). Case studies are used in order to highlight participants‟ sense of organisational 
justice. The relationship between the sense of organisational justice and the likelihood to 
blow the whistle is tested by presenting the participants with case studies, which present 
fair/unfair situations5, designed to test (1) procedural justice, (2) distributive justice and (3) 
interactional justice (Seifert et al, 2010). 
The design of the questionnaires is similar to Seifert et al (2010), where participants were 
presented with a core scenario, followed by six sub-scenarios contrasting fair/unfair aspects 
of the three justice dimensions (see Appendix 1). This research design differs from that of 
Seifert et al (2010) as the participants of that study were exposed to 3 randomised sub-
scenarios. This study exposes the participants to all six sub-scenarios6. The core scenario 
was adapted to an external auditing context by using the scenarios presented by Brennan 
and Kelly (2007). In the core scenario, a trainee auditor discovers a material misstatement in 
the client‟s records and is told by the audit partner to ignore it (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). The 
participants are then told that the trainee is considering reporting the partner‟s actions within 
the audit firm. The sub-scenarios present additional information on the audit firm‟s 
organisational whistleblowing policies (reflecting fair/unfair aspects of the three justice 
dimensions) and the participants are asked to rate the likelihood of their whistleblowing on a 
Likert scale.  
The sub-scenarios were also amended to represent an external auditing context.7 The 
whistleblowing policies and procedures reflect those used in the questionnaire by Seifert et 
                                                          
5
 Equivalent to a high or low sense of organizational justice.  
 
6
 This approach is more appropriate as this study does not consider the differences in responses 
between different classes of whistle-blowers as was the case in Seifert et al (2010).  
 
7
 Where Seifert et al‟s (2010) questionnaire reflected an organisational accountant reporting on the 
CFO‟s actions, the scenario was changed to reflect an audit trainee reporting on the audit partner‟s 
actions. Additionally, any reference to the organisation has been changed to refer to the audit firm.* 
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al (2010)8. The case studies to test procedural justice presented two cases in which the 
organisation followed fair/unfair whistleblowing procedures. The participants indicated the 
likelihood of reporting in two sub-scenarios: (1) The audit firm had a previous incidence of 
whistleblowing where the whistleblower‟s identity was exposed and (2) the whistleblower‟s 
anonymity was preserved (Seifert et al, 2010).  
Interactional justice is represented by another two sub-scenarios: (1) The audit firm 
management presents the whistleblowing process in a polite and respectful manner and (2) 
the audit firm management presents the whistleblowing process with a „threatening 
demeanour to potential whistleblowers‟ (Seifert et al, 2010). Lastly, distributive justice is 
tested by contrasting a case that resulted in a fair outcome for a past whistleblower (the risk 
was identified and the wrongdoing stopped) with a case where there was an unfair outcome 
(the organisation failed to respond to the whistle-blowing process) (Seifert et al, 2010).  
The Likert scale ranges from (1) definitely not reporting to (9) definitely reporting (Seifert et 
al, 2010). The results of these ratings are submitted to a dependent t-test for paired samples 
(or repeated measures t-test) to investigate whether there are significant differences (at a 
1% level) between participants‟ propensity to blow the whistle in low and high justice 
conditions (i.e. for low and high levels of distributive, procedural and interactional justice) 
(adapted from Seifert et al, 2010; Brennan and Kelly, 2007). . These results are summarised 
in Section 4.2.  
Two one-way within subjects (repeated measures) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) are also 
performed to determine whether the type of justice affects the decision to blow the whistle. 
The first ANOVA is performed using the participants‟ responses to the questions involving 
low justice conditions. The second ANOVA is performed using the participants‟ responses to 
the questions involving high justice conditions. These results are summarised in Section 
4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.    
For each of the above tests, a Kolmogorov–Smirnov and „skewness‟ test confirmed the 
normality of the preliminary data and a Levene‟s test indicated that the variances between 
the data groups are equal. Due to the normal distribution of the data, homogeneity of 
variances, and the fact that each scenario describes a separate case, the researchers 
                                                          
8
 Seifert et al (2010) based the whistleblowing policies used in the questionnaires on Proctor and 
Gamble Corporation‟s policies, as it won a U.K. award for the „Most Whistle-Blowing Friendly Culture‟ 
in 2004 (Proctor and Gamble, 2005; Seifert et al, 2010). 
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assumed that the requirement for random independent samples was met9 (consistent with 
the approach followed by Seifert et al (2010)) 
Bivariate descriptive statistics are also performed to determine if the „other motivational 
factors‟ (extraneous variables), discussed in Section 2.4, affect the decision to blow the 
whistle. This involves independent sample t-tests to investigate the effect of gender and age 
on the propensity to blow the whistle. The effects of seniority, performance rating and 
religion are confirmed using one-way ANOVA tests. As before, the data was tested for 
normality. A Levene‟s test for equality of variance was done in each case and, where there 
was no homogeneity among any data groups, a Scheffe‟s Post Hoc test for multiple 
comparisons is used. These results are summarised in Section 4.3. 
As an additional validity safeguard, the questionnaire and scenarios were carefully 
constructed. As discussed above, the cases were developed from scenarios already applied 
in leading accounting journals. The questionnaires do not use the term „whistleblowing,‟ as 
the connotations of the term may be interpreted differently by respondents and can lead to 
result bias (Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Creswell, 2009). To further mitigate the bias of 
participants feeling inclined to provide the perceived socially or ethically „correct response‟ 
(Brennan and Kelly, 2007), the case study scenarios are written in the third person. 
Participants are also informed that their responses are confidential (Arnold & Ponemon, 
1991; Seifert et al, 2010). Furthermore, the case study scenarios did not refer to any specific 
auditing firm. This reduces any possible bias which participants may have had against, or in 
favour of, a specific auditing firm and its actual whistleblowing policies. Finally, although 
minimal changes were made to the case study scenarios used by Brennan and Kelly (2007) 
and Seifert et al (2010), a pilot study was conducted on 25 undergraduate accounting 
students before the data was collated. This was done to increase the reliability of the actual 
findings as the data from the pilot study was used to run preliminary results.10 
                                                          
9
 Each of these are important statistical assumptions which needed to be addressed to ensure 
research validity and reliability.  
 
10
 This included a paired sample t-test and an ANOVA on one of the justice sub-sets. Due to the fact 
that each scenario only has two questions, dealing with low and high senses of justice, measures of 
internal consistency (such as the Cronbach‟s alpha) were not required. No material changes were 
made to the questionnaires/scenarios as a result of the pilot study. The data from the pilot study was 
not included in the final data sets analysed in Section 4  
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3.2 Population and sample  
3.2.1. Population 
The population includes all trainee auditors completing their articles to qualify as South 
African Chartered Accountants at one of the large South African audit firms (see Section 
1.5). 
Trainee auditors were selected for important reasons. Whistleblowers must be willing to 
challenge an organisation‟s „authority structure‟ (Miceli & Near, 1985), which forms the basis 
for an entity‟s operations (Miceli & Near, 1985; Weber, 1947). Brennan and Kelly (2007) note 
that many audit firms operate using „formal hierarchal structures,‟ which range from the 
highest level of seniority (managing partner) down to the trainee auditor. The IAASB (2013) 
states that a considerable amount of „detailed audit work‟ may be performed by 
inexperienced staff and it is critical that such work is supervised by more experienced staff to 
maintain audit quality. It is likely that a trainee auditor would be regularly supervised by more 
senior staff and so it is important that trainee auditors have confidence in the firm‟s internal 
whistleblowing channels and are encouraged to report wrongdoing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). 
Trainees are, however, unlikely to have been completely familiar with organisational culture, 
including power and political dynamics, allowing the research to hold other variables that 
could impact the whistle-blowing decision constant.  
Finally, trainee auditors, unlike students, have work experience and, hence, may be exposed 
to „ethical dilemmas‟ (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). These „ethical dilemmas‟ may also be more 
relevant and critical to trainee auditors than to those at senior level, as they are at an „early 
stage in their careers‟ and may not want to blow the whistle due to the risk which reporting 
could have on advancing in their careers (Brennan & Kelly, 2007).  
3.2.2. Sample and sampling method 
  The sample consists of 157 trainee auditors completing their first, second and third year of 
articles to become South African Chartered Accountants at any large or medium sized 
auditing firms. The sample is of an adequate size to highlight statistically significant 
relationships for the analysis is consistent with sample sizes used in previous whistleblowing 
research (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009; Mustapha & Siaw, 
2012; Read & Rama, 2003; Brennan & Kelly, 2007). 
Due to inherent time and cost constraints the sample was not random, and motivated by 
convenience. An online questionnaire was emailed to trainee auditors by audit firm 
representatives. Non-response bias could not be tested, as no data was available on the 
non-respondents (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). This may lead to a degree of result bias. 
25 
 
Responses were, however, obtained from all audit firms approached to participate in the 
study. A number of reliability tests are also included in the analysis, as discussed in  
Section 3.1.  
The univariate descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.1 (see also Section 4.1). Most 
of the 157 respondents are males (51%) and younger than 25 years old (57.3%). The largest 
number of respondents are in their first year of articles to qualify, followed by those who are 
in their third (32.5%) and second year of articles (26.8%). Little to none of the respondents 
indicate that they have recently received a low performance rating of 1 (0%) or 2 (7.6%), with 
the vast majority of respondents indicating that their most recent performance rating has 
been 4 or above (49%), followed by a performance rating of 3 (43.3%). The largest number 
of respondents indicate that religion is very important to them (47.1%), followed by those 
who indicate that religion is fairly important (32.5%) and the least number of respondents 
indicate that religion is not important at all (20.4%).  
  Table 3.1: Demographic summary  
 N N % 
Gender Male 80 51.0% 
Female 77 49.0% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Age Below 25 years old 90 57.3% 
25 years old or above 67 42.7% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Level of seniority First year 64 40.8% 
Second year 42 26.8% 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 32.5% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Most recent 
performance rating 
1 (Failed to meet expectations) 0 0.0% 
2 12 7.6% 
3 68 43.3% 
4 or above (Exceeds 
expectations) 
77 49.0% 
Total 157 100.0% 
How important is 
religion to you? 
Not important at all 32 20.4% 
Fairly important 51 32.5% 
Very important 74 47.1% 
Total 157 100.0% 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Section 4.1 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the sample, before 
proceeding with the primary analysis of the impact of organisational justice on the decision to 
blow the whistle. Based on these overall results, it is apparent that higher levels of 
organisational justice increase the trainee auditors‟ propensity to blow the whistle. Section 
4.2 presents the primary statistical analysis. It indicates that higher levels of organisational 
justice incorporated into whistleblowing policies are positively correlated with a trainee‟s 
propensity to blow the whistle. Section 4.3 presents the analyses performed to determine 
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whether the extraneous variables (professional performance, religion, seniority, age and 
gender) affect the decision to blow the whistle. 
4.1 Cursory analysis: Univariate descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 represents the complete demographic information of the 157 trainee auditors who 
participated in the study. 
Table 1.1: Demographic summary 
 N N N % 
Gender Male 80 51.0% 
Female 77 49.0% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Age Below 25 years old 90 57.3% 
25 years old or above 67 42.7% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Level of seniority First year 64 40.8% 
Second year 42 26.8% 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 32.5% 
Total 157 100.0% 
Most recent 
performance rating 
1 (Failed to meet expectations) 0 0.0% 
2 12 7.6% 
3 68 43.3% 
4 or above (Exceeds 
expectations) 
77 49.0% 
Total 157 100.0% 
How important is 
religion to you? 
Not important at all 32 20.4% 
Fairly important 51 32.5% 
Very important 74 47.1% 
Total 157 100.0% 
 
Table 1.2 represents the complete descriptive statistics of the respondents‟ propensity to 
blow the whistle in each of the scenarios. There were a greater number of respondents who 
indicated an increased likelihood to blow the whistle in the scenarios representing high 
justice perceptions than in the scenarios representing low justice perceptions. This pattern 
was consistent in all three justice dimensions (procedural, interactional and distributive). In 
the case of procedural justice, the majority (22.3%) of respondents indicated a likelihood of 1 
when the condition was low and a 9 (31.2%) when it was high. In low interactional justice the 
majority (22.9%) indicated a likelihood of 2 and a 9 (31.8%) in high interactional justice. In 
the case of interactional justice, the majority (15.9%) of respondents indicated a likelihood of 
3 when the condition was low and a 9 (23.6%) when it was high. 
In the cases of high procedural, interactional and distributive justice, there were a larger 
number of respondents who indicated their likelihood of reporting as 7 or more (70.7%, 
73.9% and 67.5% respectively) than those indicating their likelihood of reporting as less than 
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7 (29.3%, 26.1% and 32.5% respectively). In the cases of low procedural and interactional 
justice, there were a larger number of respondents who indicated their likelihood of reporting 
as 3 or less (56.7% and 52.2%) than respondents who indicated their likelihood of reporting 
as more than 3 (43.3% and 47.8%). When distributive justice is low, however, a lower 
number of respondents indicated their likelihood to report as 3 or less (42.0%) than 
respondents who indicated their likelihood of reporting as more than 3 (58.0%). This 
suggests that a lower level of distributive justice is not as great an impediment to 
whistleblowing as a low level of interactional or procedural justice (see also Figure 1).  
Table 1.2: Propensity to blow the whistle 
Likelihood of 
reporting 
Low 
procedural 
justice 
High 
procedural 
justice 
Low 
interactional 
justice 
High 
interactional 
justice 
Low 
distributive 
justice 
High 
distributive 
justice 
1  35 7 23 2 18 5 
22.3% 4.5% 14.6% 1.3% 11.5% 3.2% 
2 26 3 36 5 23 5 
16.6% 1.9% 22.9% 3.2% 14.6% 3.2% 
3 28 7 23 2 25 5 
17.8% 4.5% 14.6% 1.3% 15.9% 3.2% 
4 18 6 18 7 12 5 
11.5% 3.8% 11.5% 4.5% 7.6% 3.2% 
5  15 15 17 14 21 15 
9.6% 9.6% 10.8% 8.9% 13.4% 9.6% 
6 12 8 16 11 24 16 
7.6% 5.1% 10.2% 7.0% 15.3% 10.2% 
7 13 28 12 27 9 34 
8.3% 17.8% 7.6% 17.2% 5.7% 21.7% 
8 5 34 5 39 9 35 
3.2% 21.7% 3.2% 24.8% 5.7% 22.3% 
9  5 49 7 50 16 37 
3.2% 31.2% 4.5% 31.8% 10.2% 23.6% 
Total 157 157 157 157 157 157 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Figure 1: Propensity to blow the whistle 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 represents the means for the descriptive statistics in each of the case study 
scenarios, reflecting the respondents‟ likelihood to blow the whistle. Across all three 
dimensions of organisational justice (procedural, interactional and distributive justice), there 
is a greater likelihood to blow the whistle when that justice dimension is perceived as high ( 
For procedural justice, Meanhigh= 6.94, for interactional justice Meanhigh= 7.22 and distributive 
justice Meanhigh= 6.83 respectively) than when the justice dimension is perceived as low (For 
procedural justice, Meanlow= 3.61 , for interactional justice Meanlow= 3.85 and distributive 
justice Meanlow=  4.55 respectively). 
 
 
 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Low procedural justice
High procedural justice
Low interactional justice
High interactional justice
Low distributive justice
High distributive justice
1 (Definitely will not report) 2
3 4
5 (Likelihood of reporting is 50%) 6
7 8
9 (Definitely will report)
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Table 1.3: Propensity to blow the whistle (means) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation 
Scenario 1: Low procedural justice 157 1 9 3.61 2.275 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice 157 1 9 6.94 2.251 
Scenario 3: Low interactional justice 157 1 9 3.85 2.285 
Scenario 4: High interactional justice 157 1 9 7.22 1.946 
Scenario 5: Low distributive justice 157 1 9 4.55 2.497 
Scenario 6: High distributive justice 157 1 9 6.83 2.094 
Valid N  157     
 
Overall, the preliminary analysis provides evidence in support of the propositions in Section 
2.3.2. When there is a higher level of procedural (Meanlow= 3.61; Meanhigh= 6.94), 
interactional (Meanlow= 3.85; Meanhigh= 7.22) or distributive justice (Meanlow= 4.55; Meanhigh= 
6.83), trainee auditors reported that they were, on average, more likely to blow the whistle.  
To test this assertion further, the data was then subject to dependent-tests and one-way 
ANOVA‟s to test for statistically significant changes in responses from high to low justice 
scenarios.  
4.2 Primary analyses  
A dependent t-test for paired samples was performed to determine whether the difference 
between participants‟ propensity to blow the whistle in cases of low and high levels of justice 
is significant. Table 2.1 represents the statistics for the paired sample t-test (see also Figure 
2). 
Table 2.1: Dependent sample t-test statistics 
 Mean N Std. deviation Std. error mean 
Pair 1 Scenario 1: Low procedural justice 3.61 157 2.275 .182 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice 6.94 157 2.251 .180 
Pair 2 Scenario 3: Low interactional justice 3.85 157 2.285 .182 
Scenario 4: High interactional justice 7.22 157 1.946 .155 
Pair 3 Scenario 5: Low distributive justice 4.55 157 2.497 .199 
Scenario 6: High distributive justice 6.83 157 2.094 .167 
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Figure 2: Dependent sample t-test statistics 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows the paired samples‟ correlations between the propensity to blow the whistle 
in cases of low and high justice. The correlations are all significant (more than 1%), positive 
and below .4 (For procedural justice, r= .397, interactional justice, r= .260 and distributive 
justice, r= .331). This indicates an increased propensity to blow the whistle when there is 
high procedural, interactional or distributive justice and a lower propensity to blow the whistle 
when there is low procedural, interactional or distributive justice. This relationship is most 
significant in the case of procedural justice (r=.397, p<.001) and least significant in the case 
of interactional justice (r=.260, p<.01) (see also Figure 3). 
Table 2.2: Paired sample correlations for dependent sample t-test 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Scenario 1: Low procedural justice & 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice 
157 .397 .000 
Pair 2 Scenario 3: Low interactional justice & 
Scenario 4: High interactional justice 
157 .260 .001 
Pair 3 Scenario 5: Low distributive justice & 
Scenario 6: High distributive justice 
157 .331 .000 
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Figure 3: Paired sample correlations for dependent sample t-test 
 
 
Table 2.3 below presents the results of the dependent t-test for paired samples. The mean 
differences in propensity to blow the whistle between cases of high justice levels and cases 
of low justice levels are significant. This is attributable to the mean differences in the cases 
of differing procedural (t(156)=-16.831, p<.001), interactional ( t(156)=-16.315, p<.001)  and 
distributive justice (t(156)=-10.647, p<.001) levels being highly significant at a .1% 
significance level (see also Figure 4). These findings support Proposition 1, 2 and 3 as an 
increased sense of distributive, interactional and procedural justice increases trainee 
auditors‟ propensity to blow the whistle. These results are consistent with Seifert et al (2010) 
and Treviño and Weaver (2001). 
Table 2.3: Results of dependent sample t-test 
 
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Scenario 1: Low 
procedural justice - 
Scenario 2: High 
procedural justice 
Scenario 3: Low 
interactional justice - 
Scenario 4: High 
interactional justice 
Scenario 5: Low 
distributive justice 
- Scenario 6: High 
distributive justice 
Paired differences 
Mean -3.338 -3.369 -2.274 
Std. deviation 2.485 2.588 2.676 
Std. error mean .198 .207 .214 
95% confidence interval 
of the difference 
Lower -3.729 -3.777 -2.696 
Upper -2.946 -2.961 -1.852 
t -16.831 -16.315 -10.647 
df 156 156 156 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
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Figure 4: Results of dependent sample t-test 
 
 
To explore further the relationship between organisational justice and trainee auditors‟ 
propensity to blow the whistle, the researcher considered whether the type of organisational 
justice affected the whistleblowing decision in high or low states of organisational justice. 
This provided additional evidence in support of each of the propositions in Section 2.3.2. 
Tests for the low justice condition are presented in Section 4.2.1. Tests for the high justice 
condition are presented in Section 4.2.2.  
4.2.1 Low justice conditions 
A one-way within subjects (repeated measures) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to investigate whether the type of justice (procedural, interactional or distributive 
justice) affects the decision to blow the whistle in low justice conditions.  The descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2.4. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the results of the 
multivariate tests performed to determine and compare the means of the propensity to blow 
the whistle when procedural, interactional and distributive justice levels are perceived as low. 
Table 2.5 indicates that the effect of the low justice condition on the propensity to blow the 
whistle is significant (Wilk‟s Lamda= .870, F(2,155)= 11.564, p < .001). This suggests that 
the extent to which low justice conditions deter whistleblowing depends on the type of low 
justice condition experienced. Specifically, the results suggest that low distributive justice 
(M= 4.55, SD= 2.497) is less of a deterrent for whistleblowing than low interactional (M= 
3.85, SD= 2.285) and procedural justice (M= 3.61, SD= 2.275). In addition, Table 2.6 
indicates that the overlap in 95% confidence intervals for the mean propensity to blow the 
whistle in cases of low procedural and interactional justice shows that respondents‟ 
3.34 3.37 
2.27 
Procedural justice Interactional justice Distributive justice
Mean difference (High - Low)
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inclination to blow the whistle did not differ significantly. Consequently, low procedural and 
interactional justice can be considered equally effective deterrents to whistleblowing (see 
also Figure 5 and Figure 6).  
What this implies is that none of the dimensions of organisational justice is irrelevant. Low 
states of distributive, procedural or interactional justice reduce the likelihood of reporting; low 
distributive justice has the least negative effect.  
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in low justice conditions 
 Mean Std. deviation N 
Scenario 1: Low procedural justice 3.61 2.275 157 
Scenario 3: Low interactional justice 3.85 2.285 157 
Scenario 5: Low distributive justice 4.55 2.497 157 
 
Table 2.5: Multivariate statistics for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in low justice conditions 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial eta squared 
Low justice 
Pillai's trace .130 11.564
b
 2.000 155.000 .000 .130 
Wilks' lambda .870 11.564
b
 2.000 155.000 .000 .130 
Hotelling's trace .149 11.564
b
 2.000 155.000 .000 .130 
Roy's largest root .149 11.564
b
 2.000 155.000 .000 .130 
b. Exact statistic 
 
Table 2.6: Estimated marginal means for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in low justice conditions 
Low justice Mean Std. error 95% Confidence interval 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Procedural justice 3.605 .182 3.246 3.964 
Interactional justice 3.847 .182 3.487 4.207 
Distributive justice 4.554 .199 4.160 4.948 
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Figure 5: Estimated marginal means for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in low justice conditions 
 
 
Figure 6: 95% Confidence Intervals for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in low justice conditions 
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4.2.2 High justice conditions 
A one-way within subjects (repeated measures) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to investigate whether the type of justice (procedural, interactional or distributive 
justice) affects the decision to blow the whistle in high justice conditions.  The descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2.7. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 present the results of the 
multivariate tests performed to determine and compare the means of the propensity to blow 
the whistle when procedural, interactional and distributive justice levels are perceived as low. 
Table 2.8 indicates that the effect of the type of high justice condition on the propensity to 
blow the whistle is significant (Wilk‟s Lamda= .943, F(2,155)= 4.660, p < .05.). This suggests 
that the extent to which high justice conditions encourage whistleblowing depends on the 
type of high justice condition experienced. Specifically, our results suggest that high 
perceived interactional justice (M= 7.22, SD= 1.946) is more conducive to whistleblowing 
than high perceived procedural (M= 6.94, SD= 2.251) and distributive justice (M= 6.83, SD= 
2.094). 
Furthermore, Table 2.9 indicates that the overlap in 95% confidence intervals for the mean 
propensity to blow the whistle in cases of high procedural and interactional justice shows 
that respondents‟ propensity to blow the whistle did not differ significantly. Consequently, 
high procedural and interactional justice can be considered equally effective motivations for 
whistleblowing (see also Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
These findings confirm the results presented in Section 4.1. The sense of distributive, 
procedural and interactive justice is a relevant consideration for trainee auditors deciding to 
report malpractice. This is true when there is a low level of justice (Section 4.2.1) and when 
there is a high level of justice, as discussed above. In other words, procedural, interactional 
and distributive justice are correlated with the likelihood of blowing the whistle as per 
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 (Section 2.3.2) 
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in high justice conditions 
 Mean Std. deviation N 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice 6.94 2.251 157 
   Scenario 4: High interactional justice 7.22 1.946 157 
 Scenario 6: High distributive justice 6.83 2.094 157 
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Table 2.8: Multivariate statistics for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in high justice conditions 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial eta squared 
Justice Type Pillai's Trace .057 4.660
b
 2.000 155.000 .011 .057 
Wilks' Lambda .943 4.660
b
 2.000 155.000 .011 .057 
Hotelling's Trace .060 4.660
b
 2.000 155.000 .011 .057 
Roy's Largest Root .060 4.660
b
 2.000 155.000 .011 .057 
b. Exact statistic 
 
Table 2.9: Estimated marginal means for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in high justice conditions 
Justice type Mean Std. error 95% confidence interval 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Procedural justice 6.943 .180 6.588 7.298 
Interactional justice 7.217 .155 6.910 7.523 
Distributive justice 6.828 .167 6.498 7.158 
 
Figure 7: Estimated marginal means for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in high justice conditions 
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Figure 8: 95% Confidence intervals for the ANOVA investigating the effect of the type of justice on the 
propensity to blow the whistle in high justice conditions 
 
 
As a final test, the effect of the control variables discussed in Section 2.4 was considered.  
as discussed in Section 4.3, after taking into account differences in gender, age, seniority, 
performance ratings and religion and investigating whether there is still strong evidence in 
support of Proposition 1, 2 and 3. 
4.3 Extraneous variables: Bivariate descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the complete information regarding the mean propensity to blow the whistle 
amongst male and female respondents in each scenario (see also Figure 9). There do not 
appear to be significant differences in the mean propensities to blow the whistle per gender 
in the cases of procedural (For males, Meanlow= 3.69; Meanhigh= 6.86 and females, Meanlow= 
3.52; Meanhigh= 7.03), interactional (For males, Meanlow= 3.75; Meanhigh= 7.10 and females, 
Meanlow= 3.75; Meanhigh= 7.34) or distributive justice (For males, Meanlow= 4.35; Meanhigh= 
6.6 and females, Meanlow= 4.77; Meanhigh= 7.06). Independent sample t-tests were 
performed to confirm that gender has no effect on the willingness to blow the whistle. 
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Table 3.1: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by gender 
 Gender N Mean Std. deviation Std. error mean 
Scenario 1: Low procedural justice Male 80 3.69 2.309 .258 
Female 77 3.52 2.251 .257 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice Male 80 6.86 2.220 .248 
Female 77 7.03 2.294 .261 
Scenario 3: Low interactional justice Male 80 3.75 2.179 .244 
Female 77 3.95 2.400 .274 
Scenario 4: High interactional justice Male 80 7.10 1.946 .218 
Female 77 7.34 1.951 .222 
Scenario 5: Low distributive justice Male 80 4.35 2.506 .280 
Female 77 4.77 2.486 .283 
Scenario 6: High distributive justice Male 80 6.60 2.108 .236 
Female 77 7.06 2.067 .236 
 
Figure 9: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by gender 
 
 
Gender did not have a significant effect on the propensity to blow the whistle as was 
confirmed by the results of independent sample t-tests in Table 3.2 below. For each of the 
justice dimensions, the mean differences are small and the overlap of 95% confidence 
intervals does not indicate a significant effect. 
 In each of the scenarios, the Levene‟s test for equality of variances (p>.05) confirmed that 
there was homogeneity. The finding that gender is irrelevant to the whistleblowing decision is 
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consistent with Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Mustapha and Siaw (2012), but contrary to 
prior literature that found one gender group was more likely to blow the whistle than the 
other (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009; Miceli & Near, 1988; Seifert et al, 2010). Overall, 
however, the results do not provide evidence to refute Proposition 1, 2 or 3.  
Table 3.2: Independent sample t-tests investigating the effect of gender on the propensity to blow the whistle 
 
t-test for equality of means 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
95% confidence interval 
of the difference 
Lower Upper 
Low procedural justice .461 155 .645 .168 .364 -.551 .887 
High procedural justice -.454 155 .651 -.163 .360 -.875 .548 
Low interactional justice -.542 155 .589 -.198 .366 -.920 .524 
High interactional justice -.764 155 .446 -.238 .311 -.852 .377 
Low distributive justice -1.044 155 .298 -.416 .399 -1.204 .371 
High distributive justice -1.395 155 .165 -.465 .333 -1.123 .194 
 
Table 3.3 shows the complete information regarding the mean propensity to blow the whistle 
amongst respondents below 25 years and those that are 25 years old or above in response 
to each scenario (see also Figure 10). There do not appear to be significant differences in 
the mean propensities to blow the whistle per age in the cases of procedural (for trainees 
below 25 years old, Meanlow= 3.71; Meanhigh= 6.78 and 25 years or above, Meanlow= 3.46; 
Meanhigh= 7.16), interactional (for trainees below 25 years old, Meanlow= 3.58; Meanhigh= 7.09 
and 25 years or above, Meanlow= 4.21; Meanhigh= 7.39) or distributive justice (for trainees 
below 25 years old, Meanlow= 4.62; Meanhigh= 6.78 and 25 years or above, Meanlow= 4.46; 
Meanhigh= 6.90). Independent samples t-tests were performed to confirm that age has no 
effect on the propensity to blow the whistle. 
Table 3.3: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by age 
 Age N Mean Std. 
deviation 
Std. error mean 
Scenario 1: Low procedural justice Below 25 years old 90 3.71 2.245 .237 
25 years old or above 67 3.46 2.325 .284 
Scenario 2: High procedural justice Below 25 years old 90 6.78 2.287 .241 
25 years old or above 67 7.16 2.199 .269 
Scenario 3: Low interactional justice Below 25 years old 90 3.58 2.044 .215 
25 years old or above 67 4.21 2.544 .311 
Scenario 4: High interactional justice Below 25 years old 90 7.09 2.020 .213 
25 years old or above 67 7.39 1.842 .225 
Scenario 5: Low distributive justice Below 25 years old 90 4.62 2.415 .255 
25 years old or above 67 4.46 2.619 .320 
Scenario 6: High distributive justice Below 25 years old 90 6.78 2.092 .221 
25 years old or above 67 6.90 2.112 .258 
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Figure 10: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by age 
 
 
Contrary to the findings of Brennan and Kelly (2007), age did not have a significant effect on 
the propensity to blow the whistle. This finding was confirmed by the results of independent 
sample t-tests in Table 3.4 below. For each of the justice dimensions, the mean differences 
are small and the overlap of 95% confidence intervals does not indicate a significant effect 
on blowing the whistle.  
In each of the scenarios, the Levene‟s test for equality of variances (p>.05) confirmed that 
there was homogeneity. In the case of Low interactional justice, the robust test for two mean 
differences is reported in Table 3.4. Overall, however, the results do not provide evidence to 
refute Proposition 1, 2 or 3. 
Table 3.4: Independent sample t-tests investigating the effect of age on the propensity to blow the whistle 
 
t-test for Equality of means 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
95% confidence interval 
of the difference 
Lower Upper 
Low procedural justice .676 155 .500 .248 .368 -.478 .975 
High procedural justice -1.064 155 .289 -.386 .363 -1.104 .331 
Low interactional justice
++
 -1.669 123.545 .098 -.631 .378 -1.380 .117 
High interactional justice -.953 155 .342 -.299 .314 -.920 .321 
Low distributive justice .395 155 .693 .160 .404 -.639 .958 
High distributive justice -.347 155 .729 -.118 .339 -.787 .552 
++
 Equal Variance not assumed 
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Table 3.5 shows the complete information regarding the mean propensity to blow the whistle 
amongst respondents in their first, second and third year of articles to become a CA (SA) in 
each scenario (see also Figure 11). There do not appear to be significant differences in the 
mean propensities to blow the whistle per seniority level in the cases of procedural (For first 
years, Meanlow= 3.73; Meanhigh= 6.89, second years, Meanlow= 3.67; Meanhigh= 7.29 and third 
years, Meanlow= 3.39; Meanhigh= 6.73), interactional (For first years, Meanlow= 3.81; Meanhigh= 
7.47, second years, Meanlow= 4.21; Meanhigh= 7.38 and third years, Meanlow= 3.59; Meanhigh= 
6.76) or distributive justice (For first years, Meanlow= 4.72; Meanhigh= 6.97, second years, 
Meanlow= 5.07; Meanhigh= 7.29 and third years, Meanlow= 3.92; Meanhigh= 6.27). A one-way 
ANOVA was performed to confirm that seniority has no effect on the propensity to blow the 
whistle. 
Table 3.5: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by seniority level 
 Seniority level N Mean Std. deviation Std. error 
Low procedural 
Justice 
First year 64 3.73 2.338 .292 
Second year 42 3.67 2.281 .352 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 3.39 2.219 .311 
Total 157 3.61 2.275 .182 
High procedural 
justice 
First year 64 6.89 2.317 .290 
Second year 42 7.29 1.979 .305 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 6.73 2.384 .334 
Total 157 6.94 2.251 .180 
Low interactional 
justice 
First year 64 3.81 2.152 .269 
Second year 42 4.21 2.664 .411 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 3.59 2.109 .295 
Total 157 3.85 2.285 .182 
High interactional 
justice 
First year 64 7.47 1.681 .210 
Second year 42 7.38 1.925 .297 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 6.76 2.214 .310 
Total 157 7.22 1.946 .155 
Low distributive 
justice 
First year 64 4.72 2.407 .301 
Second year 42 5.07 2.735 .422 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 3.92 2.314 .324 
Total 157 4.55 2.497 .199 
High distributive 
justice 
First year 64 6.97 1.910 .239 
Second year 42 7.29 1.916 .296 
Third year (Audit senior) 51 6.27 2.359 .330 
Total 157 6.83 2.094 .167 
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Seniority did not have a significant effect on the propensity to blow the whistle, which is 
contrary to the findings of Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Miceli and Near (1988). This finding 
was confirmed by a one-way ANOVA test (see Table 3.6) to investigate the effect of seniority 
on the propensity to blow the whistle. For each of the justice dimensions, the mean 
differences are small and the overlap of 95% confidence intervals does not indicate a 
significant effect on the willingness to blow the whistle.  
In each of the scenarios, the Levene‟s test for equality of variances (p>.05) confirmed that 
there was homogeneity. Overall, the results do not provide evidence to refute Proposition 1, 
2 or 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Mean propensity to blow the whistle by seniority level 
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Table 3.6: Equal variance ANOVA investigating the effect of seniority on the propensity to blow the whistle 
 Sum of squares Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Low procedural justice Between groups 3.541 2 1.771 .339 .713 
Within groups 803.975 154 5.221   
Total 807.516 156    
High procedural justice Between groups 7.521 2 3.761 .740 .479 
Within groups 782.963 154 5.084   
Total 790.484 156    
Low interactional justice Between groups 9.157 2 4.578 .876 .419 
Within groups 805.174 154 5.228   
Total 814.331 156    
High interactional justice Between groups 15.618 2 7.809 2.091 .127 
Within groups 575.019 154 3.734   
Total 590.637 156    
Low distributive justice Between groups 33.380 2 16.690 2.736 .068 
Within groups 939.409 154 6.100   
Total 972.790 156    
High distributive justice Between groups 25.691 2 12.845 3.003 .053 
Within groups 658.666 154 4.277   
Total 684.357 156    
 
Table 3.7 shows the complete information regarding the mean propensity to blow the whistle 
for respondents with most recent performance rating ranging from 1 (failed to meet 
expectations) to 4 or above (exceeds expectation) (see also Figure 11). There do not appear 
to be significant differences in the mean propensities to blow the whistle per performance 
rating (3 and 4 or above) in the cases of procedural (For a rating of 3, Meanlow= 3.59; 
Meanhigh= 6.97 and rating of 4 or above, Meanlow= 3.77; Meanhigh= 7.01), (For a rating of 3, 
Meanlow=  4.04; Meanhigh= 7.37and rating of 4 or above, Meanlow= 4; Meanhigh= 7.18) or 
distributive justice (For a rating of 3, Meanlow= 4.56; Meanhigh= 6.96 and rating of 4 or above, 
Meanlow= 4.70; Meanhigh= 6.81). Interestingly, those with a performance rating of 2 seemed 
to rate their propensity to blow the whistle as lower than those with higher performance 
ratings in the case of procedural ( Meanlow= 2.67 ; Meanhigh= 6.33), interactional (Meanlow= 
1.75; Meanhigh= 4.04) or distributive justice (Meanlow= 3.58; Meanhigh= 6.25). A one-way 
ANOVA and Scheffe‟s Post Hoc test for multiple comparisons was performed to investigate 
whether performance rating has an effect on the propensity to blow the whistle. 
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Table 3.7: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by performance rating 
 Performance rating N Mean Std. deviation Std. error 
Scenario 1: Low procedural 
justice 
2 12 2.67 1.670 .482 
3 68 3.59 2.332 .283 
4 or above  77 3.77 2.294 .261 
Total 157 3.61 2.275 .182 
Scenario 2: High procedural 
justice 
2 12 6.33 1.875 .541 
3 68 6.97 2.318 .281 
4 or above  77 7.01 2.257 .257 
Total 157 6.94 2.251 .180 
Scenario 3: Low interactional 
justice 
2 12 1.75 .622 .179 
3 68 4.04 2.372 .288 
4 or above  77 4.00 2.224 .253 
Total 157 3.85 2.285 .182 
Scenario 4: High interactional 
justice 
2 12 6.58 2.234 .645 
3 68 7.37 1.795 .218 
4 or above  77 7.18 2.031 .231 
Total 157 7.22 1.946 .155 
Scenario 5: Low distributive 
justice 
2 12 3.58 2.353 .679 
3 68 4.56 2.530 .307 
4 or above) 77 4.70 2.487 .283 
Total 157 4.55 2.497 .199 
Scenario 6: High distributive 
justice 
2 12 6.25 2.006 .579 
3 68 6.96 2.091 .254 
4 or above  77 6.81 2.122 .242 
Total 157 6.83 2.094 .167 
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Figure 11: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by performance rating 
 
 
Contrary to the findings of Miceli and Near (1988), performance ratings did not have a 
significant effect on the propensity to blow the whistle in 5 of the 6 scenarios. For these 5, 
the mean differences are small and the overlap of 95% confidence intervals does not 
indicate a significant effect on the propensity to blow the whistle. In the case of low 
interactional justice, however, there was no overlap between the 95% confidence intervals 
for a performance rating of 2 and 3. In the case of all scenarios, except for low interactional 
justice, the Levene‟s test for equality of variances (p>.05) confirmed that there was 
homogeneity. Consequently, results for five of the six scenarios were confirmed by a one-
way ANOVA test (see Table 2.8) to investigate the effect of performance rating on the 
propensity to blow the whistle. Overall, however, the results do not provide evidence to 
refute Proposition 1, 2 or 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.67 
6.33 
1.75 
6.58 
3.58 
6.25 
3.59 
6.97 
4.04 
7.37 
4.56 
6.96 
3.77 
7.01 
4.00 
7.18 
4.70 
6.81 
Low procedural justice
High procedural justice
Low interactional justice
High interactional justice
Low distributive justice
High distributive justice
1 (Failed to meet expectations) 2 3 4 or above (Exceeds expectations)
46 
 
Table 2.8: Equal variance ANOVA investigating the effect of performance rating on the propensity to blow 
the whistle 
 Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Low procedural justice Between Groups 12.586 2 6.293 1.219 .298 
Within Groups 794.929 154 5.162   
Total 807.516 156    
High procedural justice Between Groups 4.889 2 2.445 .479 .620 
Within Groups 785.595 154 5.101   
Total 790.484 156    
Low interactional justice Welch
++
 37.330 2, 72.691   .000 
Brown-Forsythe
++
 9.431 2, 149.025   .000  
High interactional justice Between Groups 6.457 2 3.228 .851 .429 
Within Groups 584.180 154 3.793   
Total 590.637 156    
Low distributive justice Between Groups 12.979 2 6.489 1.041 .356 
Within Groups 959.811 154 6.233   
Total 972.790 156    
High distributive justice Between Groups 5.161 2 2.581 .585 .558 
Within Groups 679.196 154 4.410   
Total 684.357 156    
++
 Unequal variance ANOVA 
As low interactional justice yielded unequal variances, a Scheffe‟s Post Hoc test for multiple 
comparisons was used (see Table 2.9) and confirmed that the group of respondents which 
received a rating of 2 differ significantly from the other two groups, as was expected from 
investigating the absence of an overlap in the 95% confidence intervals. The trainees who 
received a low performance rating (2 out of 4) were less likely to report wrongdoing in the 
case of low interactional justice.  
This result is probably indicative of the fact that when a trainee perceives interactions with 
the senior as less fair, the relationship is characterised more as just an economic one 
(Tansky, 1993). As a result more emphasis is placed on performance ratings (and level of 
remuneration). The result does not, therefore, refute Propositon 1, 2 and 3.  
Table 2.9: Scheffe’s Post Hoc test investigating the effect of performance rating on the propensity to blow the 
whistle when interactional justice is perceived as low 
 
(I) Most recent 
performance 
rating 
(J) Most recent 
performance 
rating 
Mean 
difference (I-J) Std. error Sig. 
95% confidence interval 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Low interactional 
justice 
2 3 -2.294
*
 .694 .005 -4.01 -.58 
4 or above  -2.250
*
 .688 .006 -3.95 -.55 
3 2 2.294
*
 .694 .005 .58 4.01 
4 or above .044 .369 .993 -.87 .96 
4 or above 2 2.250
*
 .688 .006 .55 3.95 
3 -.044 .369 .993 -.96 .87 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 2.10 shows the mean propensity to blow the whistle by respondents‟ sense of the 
importance of religion (see also Figure 12). There do not appear to be significant differences 
in the mean propensities to blow the whistle per religion in the cases of procedural (For 
those regarding religion as not important, Meanlow= 4.13; Meanhigh= 6.94, fairly important, 
Meanlow= 3.31; Meanhigh= 6.76 and very important, Meanlow= 3.58; Meanhigh= 7.07), 
interactional (For those regarding religion as not important, Meanlow= 3.88; Meanhigh= 7.13, 
fairly important, Meanlow= 4.08; Meanhigh= 7.08 and very important, Meanlow= 3.68; Meanhigh= 
7.35) or distributive justice (For those regarding religion as not important, Meanlow= 4.84; 
Meanhigh= 6.88, fairly important, Meanlow= 4.47; Meanhigh= 6.55 and very important, Meanlow= 
4.49; Meanhigh= 7.00). A one-way ANOVA was performed to confirm that religion has no 
effect on the propensity to blow the whistle. 
Table 2.10: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by respondents’ sense of the importance of religion 
 N Mean Std. deviation Std. error 
Low procedural justice Not important at all 32 4.13 2.366 .418 
Fairly important 51 3.31 1.985 .278 
Very important 74 3.58 2.410 .280 
Total 157 3.61 2.275 .182 
High procedural justice Not important at all 32 6.94 2.449 .433 
Fairly important 51 6.76 2.241 .314 
Very important 74 7.07 2.192 .255 
Total 157 6.94 2.251 .180 
Low interactional justice Not important at all 32 3.88 2.075 .367 
Fairly important 51 4.08 2.270 .318 
Very important 74 3.68 2.394 .278 
Total 157 3.85 2.285 .182 
High interactional justice Not important at all 32 7.13 2.268 .401 
Fairly important 51 7.08 1.906 .267 
Very important 74 7.35 1.839 .214 
Total 157 7.22 1.946 .155 
Low distributive justice Not important at all 32 4.84 2.411 .426 
Fairly important 51 4.47 2.572 .360 
Very important 74 4.49 2.506 .291 
Total 157 4.55 2.497 .199 
High distributive justice Not important at all 32 6.88 2.338 .413 
Fairly important 51 6.55 2.274 .318 
Very important 74 7.00 1.851 .215 
Total 157 6.83 2.094 .167 
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Figure 12: Mean propensity to blow the whistle by respondents’ sense of the importance of religion 
 
 
The respondents‟ sense of the importance of religion did not have a significant effect on the 
propensity to blow the whistle, which was confirmed by the results of a one-way ANOVA test 
to investigate the effect of the importance of religion on the propensity to blow the whistle 
(see Table 2.11).  For each of the justice dimensions, the mean differences are small and 
the overlap of 95% confidence intervals does not indicate a significant effect on the 
propensity to blow the whistle.  
In each of the scenarios, the Levene‟s test for equality of variances (p>.05) confirmed that 
there was homogeneity. Overall, the results do not provide evidence to refute Proposition 1, 
2 or 3. 
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Table 2.11: Equal variance ANOVA investigating the effect of the importance of religion on the propensity 
to blow the whistle 
 Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Low procedural justice Between groups 13.022 2 6.511 1.262 .286 
Within groups 794.494 154 5.159   
Total 807.516 156    
High procedural justice Between groups 2.770 2 1.385 .271 .763 
Within groups 787.714 154 5.115   
Total 790.484 156    
Low interactional justice Between groups 4.929 2 2.464 .469 .627 
Within groups 809.402 154 5.256   
Total 814.331 156    
High interactional justice Between groups 2.586 2 1.293 .339 .713 
Within groups 588.051 154 3.819   
Total 590.637 156    
Low distributive justice Between groups 3.379 2 1.689 .268 .765 
Within groups 969.411 154 6.295   
Total 972.790 156    
High distributive justice Between groups 6.229 2 3.115 .707 .495 
Within groups 678.127 154 4.403   
Total 684.357 156    
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5 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The objective of this research was to investigate whether trainee auditors‟ sense of 
organisational justice (comprised of procedural, interactional and distributive justice) is 
positively correlated to their willingness to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in the audit firm. It 
also aimed at determining whether the type of organisational justice (procedural, 
interactional and distributive justice) affects the propensity to blow the whistle. Lastly, it 
aimed at determining whether professional performance, morality-proxied by a sense of 
religion-, seniority, age and gender affect a trainee auditor‟s decision to blow the whistle.  
The first set of results in this study indicated that when the whistleblowing policies of an audit 
firm incorporate higher levels of organisational justice, the propensity to blow the whistle 
increases. Consequently, it can be said that trainee auditors‟ sense of organisational justice 
is positively correlated to their likelihood to blow the whistle. All three justice dimensions 
(procedural, interactional and distributive justice) are found to increase trainee auditors‟ 
propensity to disclose. This is consistent with the findings of Seifert et al (2010), and 
confirms that actions taken by an organisation‟s management play an influential role in 
encouraging whistleblowing behaviour (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009). It suggests that an 
organisation should strive to ensure that whistleblowing policies are perceived by employees 
as fair and that they should incorporate high levels of procedural, interactional and 
distributive justice (Seifert et al, 2010). An organisation may have formal whistleblowing 
policies in place, but it is critical that employees perceive that whistleblowing procedures are 
fair; management encourages whistleblowing and that they will take action to resolve alleged 
malfeasance (Seifert et al, 2010).  
The second set of analysis found that the type of justice also affects the decision to blow the 
whistle. The results found that high interactional justice was more likely to encourage 
whistleblowing than high procedural and distributive justice. Similarly, low distributive justice 
was found to be least effective as an impediment to whistleblowing, whilst low procedural 
and interactional justice were more (and similarly) effective in delaying whistleblowing. This 
suggests that, although audit firms should ensure that there is a high level of all three justice 
components of organisational justice (interactional, procedural and distributive justice) 
incorporated into whistleblowing policies, there should be a focus on positive inter-personal 
treatment among trainee auditors and their senior audit personnel. Audit firms should ensure 
that they develop a culture that encourages whistleblowing, as interactional justice seems to 
encourage whistleblowing more strongly than procedural and distributive justice. 
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The final set of results tested for the relevance of age, gender, seniority, performance ratings 
and religion. There was no evidence to suggest that these variables significantly altered the 
decision to blow the whistle. This research found that age, gender and seniority did not affect 
the trainee‟s propensity to blow the whistle. Religion was also found not to have an effect on 
the propensity to blow the whistle. Professional performance ratings also did not affect a 
trainee auditor‟s decision to blow the whistle. In the case of trainees who received low 
performance ratings (2 out of 4), however, those performance ratings decreased their 
propensity to blow the whistle when there was low interactional justice. As noted above, this 
suggests that audit firms should ensure that there is a culture that encourages 
whistleblowing. Senior audit personnel should promote the reporting of wrongdoing to 
trainees, instead of presenting whistleblowing with the threat of low performance ratings (or 
other negative consequences) if they report an issue. It also suggests that there should be a 
re-examination of the trainee performance rating process. Future research can investigate 
whether the firms‟ performance-rating systems have the unintended effect of decreasing 
trainee auditors‟ propensity to blow the whistle.  
The results of this study have important implications for the external auditing environment in 
its endeavours to improve audit quality.  Professional auditing standards and codes 
emphasise the importance of effective whistleblowing channels, yet give little or no guidance 
on the factors that encourage or hinder effective whistleblowing. The results of this research 
suggest that audit firms can strengthen the monitoring process to increase quality control, as 
envisioned by ISQC 1, by incorporating higher levels of organisational justice in their 
whistleblowing policies and procedures (IAASB, 2009b).  
The reader‟s attention is drawn to the fact that this study has limitations. Firstly, this study 
was conducted only on trainee auditors. Further research can identify whether organisational 
justice impacts on the whistleblowing decision of all audit firm personnel, including qualified 
auditors, or not. In addition, trainee auditors may present different responses to a 
hypothetical case study than in a real-life situation, as there is a degree of comfort in an 
anonymous questionnaire (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). Despite the validity safeguards 
discussed above, the case scenarios may lack the force to capture all of the factors present 
in a real-life situation, such as the threat of retaliation (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Seifert et al, 
2010). 
Secondly, the perceptions of the sample of trainee auditors chosen may also not be 
generalizable to all trainee auditors, as only trainee auditors from large and medium sized 
auditing firms have been chosen as participants. Given the similarities between large and 
medium sized audit firms (Otley & Pierce, 1996), this study may be generalizable to trainees 
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at large and medium sized firms, but not trainees at small firms. Future research could 
investigate trainees‟ propensity to blow the whistle by audit firm size in a South African 
context. 
Thirdly, although factors with a potential effect on the trainee auditor‟s whistleblowing 
decision have been identified, based on a review of prior literature (see Appendix 2), the 
possibility remains that there may be other, unidentified factors which impact the trainee 
auditor‟s decision to blow the whistle. In addition to the variables identified as excluded from 
the study, any other variables have not been examined and may constitute a possible 
limitation of the study, as these other variables may also affect the decision to blow the 
whistle. Future research could expand on this study in an attempt to develop comprehensive 
information on all the factors affecting a trainee auditor‟s decision to blow the whistle. 
Lastly, this study focussed only on internal whistleblowing. Future research can identify 
factors that are relevant to the reporting of the client‟s affairs (external whistleblowing), like 
Section 45 of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005. 
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7 APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. What is your gender? 
A) Male    
B) Female 
 
2. What is your age? 
A) Below 25 years of age   
B) 25 years old or above 
 
3. What is your level of seniority in the audit firm? 
A) First year 
B) Second year 
C) Third year (Audit senior)  
 
4. What was your most recent performance rating? 
Ranges from 1(failed to meet expectations) to 4 or above (exceeds expectations)  
A) 1 
B) 2 
C) 3 
D) 4 or above 
 
5. How important is religion to you?  
A) Very important 
B) Fairly important 
C) Not important at all 
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 Core Scenario 
This scenario is common to ALL of the following sub-scenarios and questions 
  
Jack Smith is an audit trainee and has been assigned to perform the interim audit at 
Scott Ltd. Scott Ltd is a very large pharmaceutical company quoted on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. During the course of his audit work, Jack becomes 
concerned about Scott Ltd‟s treatment of research and development expenditure. In 
particular, Jack believes that Scott Ltd is classifying some research expenditure as 
development expenditure and capitalising it on the statement of financial position. This 
accounting treatment has a material impact on the financial statements of Scott Ltd. 
Jack conveys his concerns to the audit partner who subsequently invites Jack into his 
office for a chat. The audit partner notes the concern but points out the scale and 
importance of Scott Ltd‟s operations in South Africa and impresses upon Jack that this 
client is a very important client for Jack‟s audit firm. The audit partner suggests that 
Jack „let sleeping dogs lie.‟  Jack is very concerned about the audit partner‟s response 
to the misreporting of research expenditure on Scott Ltd‟s financial statements. Jack is 
considering whether to report the actions of the audit partner within the audit firm or 
not. 
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 Scenario 1 
 Low procedural justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s audit firm‟s policy encourages employees to report ethical violations, relating to 
auditing matters, to the appropriate person. Employees may also anonymously report 
wrongdoing by calling a toll free number to an „„alert line.” The policy states that there 
are no recording devices associated with the „„alert line.” Furthermore, the company 
prohibits retaliation against those reporting wrongdoing. Jack is aware of a situation, 
however, where a colleague recently reported a wrongdoing using the „„alert line.” The 
colleague received a call back from the „„alert line” to follow up on the report. An „„alert 
line” representative explained that, if necessary, phone numbers can be retrieved from 
their system. The colleague was very upset that her phone number was recorded. 
6.1. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
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 Scenario 2 
 High procedural justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s audit firm‟s policy encourages employees to report ethical violations, relating to 
auditing matters, to the appropriate person. Employees may also anonymously report 
wrongdoing by calling a toll free number to an „„alert line.” The policy states that there 
are no recording devices associated with the „„alert line.” Furthermore, the company 
prohibits retaliation against those who report wrongdoing. Jack is aware of a situation 
where a colleague recently reported a wrongdoing using the „„alert line.” The colleague 
was satisfied that her anonymity was preserved 
6.2. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
  
Scenario 3 
 Low interactional justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s supervisor has discussed the audit firm‟s policy on reporting wrongdoing with 
Jack and other members of the department. Jack‟s supervisor, however, has stated 
that he disagrees with the policy because it encourages employees to „„spy” on each 
other. Jack is aware that his supervisor recently gave a low performance evaluation to 
another trainee for not being a „„team player.” This trainee had discovered an ethical 
breach conducted by a senior and had reported the situation shortly before the 
performance evaluation 
6.3. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
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Scenario 4 
 High interactional justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s supervisor has discussed the audit firm‟s policy on reporting wrongdoing with 
Jack and other members of the department. Jack‟s supervisor has been very 
supportive of the policy. In fact, the supervisor recently recommended a trainee for the 
audit firm‟s citizenship award because the trainee had discovered an ethical breach 
conducted by a senior and had reported the situation. 
6.4. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
  
Scenario 5 
 Low distributive justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s audit firm has had several recent incidences of ethical violations. A few months 
ago, Jack‟s friend reported some employees for charging personal mileage to the 
company. However, the company did not investigate or stop employees from charging 
personal mileage. As a result, these employees may be still charging personal mileage 
to the company. 
6.5. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
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 Scenario 6 
 High distributive justice condition (Was not shown) 
  
Jack‟s audit firm has had several recent instances of ethical violations. A few months 
ago, Jack‟s friend reported some employees for charging personal mileage to the 
company. As a result of the friend‟s complaint, the company promptly investigated and 
stopped the practice of charging personal mileage. 
6.6. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Jack will report the partner to an appropriate 
person within the audit firm? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Definitely WILL NOT report Likelihood of reporting is 
50% 
Definitely WILL report 
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8 APPENDIX 2: MOTIVATIONS FOR, AND IMPEDIMENTS TO, 
WHISTELBLOWING IDENTIFIED IN PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
Motivations and 
Impediments to Whistle-
Blowing 
Impact Source 
Included in 
Analysis 
(=Accepted 
and=Rejected) 
Level of seniority Trainee auditors‟ career 
progression increases the 
likelihood of whistleblowing  
(Brennan & Kelly, 
2007) 
 
Legislative protection Legislative protection is not a 
significant variable impacting 
trainee auditors‟ decision to 
blow the whistle 
(Brennan & Kelly, 
2007) 
 (See „Other 
Motivational 
Factors‟ Section 
2.4) 
Laws intended to encourage 
whistle-blowing increase the 
likelihood of whistle-blowing. 
(Miceli et al, 1999)  
Training in Statutory duties 
to blow the whistle 
Training increases trainee 
auditors‟ confidence in reporting 
structures, which increases the 
propensity to blow the whistle 
(Brennan & Kelly, 
2007) 
 (See „Other 
Motivational 
Factors‟ Section 
2.4) 
Size of organisation The greater the size of an 
organisation, the increased 
likelihood of whistleblowing 
(Miceli & Near, 1988)  (See „Other 
Motivational 
Factors‟ Section 
2.4) 
Larger audit firm size increases 
trainee auditors‟ confidence in 
internal whistleblowing policies 
and structures, which increases 
the propensity to blow the 
whistle 
(Brennan & Kelly, 
2007) 
 
Perceptions of personal 
costs 
The lower the costs, the greater 
the chance of reporting 
(Kaplan & Whitecotton, 
2001) 
 (See „Limitations 
and Delimitations‟ 
Section 1.4) 
Personal costs have a 
significant effect on the decision 
to blow the whistle 
(Kennett et al, 2011)  
Perceptions of personal 
responsibility 
The greater the perception, the 
greater chance of reporting 
(Kaplan & Whitecotton, 
2001; Liyanarachchi & 
Newdick, 2009) 
 (See „Limitations 
and Delimitations‟ 
Section 1.4) 
Professional commitment The greater the individual‟s 
commitment to the profession, 
(Elias, 2008; Kaplan & 
Whitecotton, 2001) 
 (See „Limitations 
and Delimitations‟ 
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the greater chance of 
whistleblowing 
Section 1.4) 
Holding a CPA certificate may 
increase whistleblowing  
(Hwang, Staley, Te 
Chen, & Lan, 2008) 
 
Moral obligation The greater the moral obligation 
to blow the whistle, the 
increased likelihood of 
whistleblowing 
(Hwang et al, 2008; 
Kennett et al, 2011; 
Liyanarachchi & 
Newdick, 2009) 
 
Lower levels of moral reasoning 
decrease the propensity to blow 
the whistle. 
(Arnold & Ponemon, 
1991) 
 
Seriousness of the 
wrongdoing 
The greater the perceived 
seriousness of the act, the 
increased likelihood to blow the 
whistle 
(Elias, 2008; Mustapha 
& Siaw, 2012) 
 (See „Other 
Motivational 
Factors‟ Section 
2.4) 
Culture The likelihood of blowing the 
whistle varies from one culture 
to the next 
(Schultz, 1993) (Conducted on 
South African 
trainees only) 
Gender Males are more likely to blow 
the whistle than females 
(Miceli & Near, 1988)  
 Females are more likely to blow 
the whistle than males 
(Liyanarachchi & 
Newdick, 2009) 
 
Age Older trainee auditors are less 
likely to report externally 
(Brennan & Kelly, 
2007) 
 
Rewards Internal auditors are more likely 
to blow the whistle when cash 
incentives or continuing 
employment contracts are 
provided 
(Xu & Ziegenfuss, 
2008) 
(See „Limitations 
and Delimitations‟ 
Section 1.4) 
Formal Structures and 
internal reporting channels 
for whistleblowing 
 
Increases likelihood of reporting (Brennan & Kelly, 
2007; Hwang et al, 
2008) 
 
Higher level of professional 
status in an organisation 
The higher the individual‟s 
professional standing, the 
increased likelihood of  blowing 
the whistle 
(Arnold & Ponemon, 
1991; Miceli & Near, 
1988) 
 
Length of service in an 
organisation 
The greater the length of 
service, the increased likelihood 
to blow the whistle 
(Miceli & Near, 1988)  
Good performance  Good performance ratings will 
increase the likelihood to blow 
the whistle. 
(Miceli & Near, 1988)  
„Positive reactions to work‟: The more positive reactions (Miceli & Near, 1988)  
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Defined by job satisfaction, 
fairness of incentives and 
performance 
employees have towards their 
work, the increased likelihood of 
blowing the whistle 
Perceptions of 
organisation‟s 
responsiveness to 
whistleblowing 
The likelihood of whistleblowing 
increases when organisations 
are perceived to be more 
responsive to whistleblowing 
(Miceli & Near, 1988)  
Organisational Justice 
related to whistleblowing 
Perceptions of organisational 
justice and organisational 
commitment to ethics programs 
increase the willingness to 
report problems (and cause less 
unethical behaviour).   
(Seifert et al, 2010; 
Treviño & Weaver, 
2001) 
 
Organisational Justice 
(General) 
   
Perceptions of fairness are 
related to altruism 
Perceptions of fairness 
positively linked to altruism and 
conscientiousness 
(Tansky, 1993)  
Perceptions of fairness are 
related to job satisfaction 
and organizational 
commitment 
Perceptions of fairness 
positively linked to job 
satisfaction and organizational 
commitment 
(Tansky, 1993)  
Perceptions of fairness are 
related to conscientiousness  
Perceptions of fairness 
positively linked to 
conscientiousness  
(Tansky, 1993)  
Interactional Justice    
Perceptions of fairness are 
strongly linked to the 
relationship between a 
supervisor and his or her 
subordinate. 
Perceptions of fairness are 
strongly linked to the 
relationship between a 
supervisor and his or her 
subordinate. 
(Tansky, 1993)  
Procedural Justice    
Relationship between 
procedural justice and 
organizational citizenship 
behaviour 
Fair treatment and fair 
procedures promote 
organizational citizenship 
behaviour 
(Moorman et al, 1993); 
(Bies et al, 1993) 
 
Distributive Justice    
Relationship between 
distributive justice and 
organisational citizenship 
Fair outcomes do not promote 
organisational citizenship 
behaviour 
(Moorman, 1991)  
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9 APPENDIX 3: TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
PDA Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Board 
ISQC1 International Standard on Quality Control 1- Quality 
Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales 
CPC Code of Professional Conduct 
IFAC International Federation of Accountants 
IRBA Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors 
SAICA South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
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